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Abstract—Due to the number of confirmed cases and casualties
of the new COVID-19 virus diminishing day after day, several
countries around the world are discussing on how to return to
the new normal way of life. In order to keep the spread of the
disease under control and avoid a second wave of infection,
one alternative being considered is the utilization of contact
tracing. However, despite several alternatives being available,
contact tracing still faces issues in terms of maintaining user
privacy and security, making its mass-adoption quite difficult.
Based on that, a novel framework for contact tracing using
blockchain as its infrastructure is presented. By integrating
blockchain with contact tracing applications, user privacy can be
guaranteed, while also providing people and government bodies
with a complete public view of all confirmed cases. Moreover,
we also investigate how public locations can aid in the contact
tracing process by measuring the risk of exposure to COVID-19
to the general public and advertising it in a blockchain. By doing
so, these locations can effectively notify of potential infection
risks, while also guaranteeing privacy and trustworthiness in
the information. Lastly, numerical results are shown in different
scenarios and conclusions are drawn.
Index Terms—Blockchain, contact tracing, COVID-19, coron-
avirus
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2020, the whole world experienced and saw the effects of
a pandemic caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus-2, known as COVID-19, with billions of people
put into quarantine, self-isolation and full lockdown [1], [2].
However, as the number of infections starts to slowly decline,
government bodies are discussing on how to adapt to life after
the pandemic, the new normal, through maintaining social
distancing, wearing masks in crowded spaces, and tracing
contacts between people, in order to control the spread of the
disease again [2].
Traditional contact tracing is a process in which health
staff members help a person to recall everyone they had
close contact during the time-frame they may have been
infectious [3]–[5]. This is done with the objective of contacting
the exposed people and warn them as quickly as possible in
order to suppress the spread of the disease and reduce its
reproduction rate. However, since traditional contact tracing
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relies on memory, its accuracy and efficiency are limited. In
addition, recent studies show that current healthcare infras-
tructures are not prepared to perform contact tracing in such
large scale, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. In the United
States, for example, an additional 50,000 people would need
to be hired and trained, while 3.6 billion dollars of funding
would be needed [5].
Considering these issues, other contact tracing solutions are
being developed and tested all over the world. Examples of
solutions used to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic occurred in
South Korea and Singapore, where the spread of the disease
was controlled by adopting a strategy of test, trace and contain
using Bluetooth technology [4], [6]. Another application that
relies on Bluetooth is being jointly developed by Apple and
Google, in which a random identifier is assigned to different
users. This eliminates the need of requiring the user’s identity,
being more privacy oriented [7]. Another solution is the one
from the United Kingdom’s national health service; however,
it saw several criticisms by the general public in terms of
what and for how long data is collected and stored [8].
Other solutions to digital contact tracing (DCT) also exist,
such as the utilization of electronic platforms that synchronize
healthcare databases and have up-to-date contact information
of all patients [3], or the utilization of the global positioning
system (GPS) combined with Wi-Fi in order to collect users’
location and position [2]. Thus, whenever an individual comes
into contact with an infected person the application sends an
alert to the person’s device.
However, despite technology significantly helping in con-
tact tracing, issues in terms of privacy still remain. In the
aforementioned solutions, for example, there is the need to
use a third party server to check for contacts and send alerts
to users [4], [6], [7]. Moreover, because these solutions are
centralized, they can suffer from malicious attacks in order to
obtain a person’s identity and its contacts, or even to spread
fake information or alerts by impersonating health authorities.
In addition, there is also the issue of contacts or test results
being altered, depending on political or personal interests, or
availability of these applications, since privacy laws can be
different between countries.
In order to overcome these issues, it is obvious that novel
DCT solutions that do not rely on trust of third parties, while
keeping users’ privacy, are needed. One alternative to over-
come these problems is by utilizing blockchain. Blockchain
consists of an open and distributed database, where no single
party has control and transactions, such as messages ex-
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changed when there is close contact between two devices, are
securely recorded in blocks [9]. Since blockchain does not
depend on a central server, it can pave the way for global
accessibility of information, while also being more robust to
malicious attacks. Blockchain can also enhance data integrity
and security, since the information of each block is visible by
all participants and cannot be tampered with, reducing the risks
of impersonation or altering test results or close contacts [9].
As such, blockchain can play an important role in increasing
the trustworthiness of contact tracing applications.
Despite DCT being a good alternative for controlling the
spread of the disease, it is only natural that whenever re-
strictions are lifted, more agglomerations start to occur. In
such cases, DCT solutions can be insufficient, thus it is
vital that public spaces have some alternative to inform the
population about potential risks. Current solutions involve
workers monitoring parks, supermarket or shop entrances in
order to control the number of people inside. However, from
the general public perspective, there is no effective way to
monitor if such place is safe or when is the best time to visit
such locations in order to minimize the risk of exposure. As
such, it is vital that public places aid in the process of contact
tracing by monitoring the number of people and calculating
a risk level depending on certain conditions. However, if the
same approaches considered in DCT are applied, similar issues
in terms of privacy and trust in third parties arise. In this case,
it can be even more concerning, since public locations would
not like to advertise their risk levels in order to reduce the
number of people, potentially leading to loss of revenue. Thus,
it is vital that some sort of control and trustless mechanisms
are envisioned in order to keep the general public informed
and safe.
Based on that, we propose a framework that integrates
blockchain as the underlying infrastructure of DCT and risk as-
sessment in public locations. In DCT messages between users
can be exchanged and confirmed cases can be stored in the
blockchain, whereas in risk assessment, public locations can
advertise their risk levels to the chain, so that it is visible for all
participants. Despite [10] being a good example of blockchain
applied to DCT, BeepTrace suffers from high computing and
complexity when it comes to the architecture with many
involved parties. In addition, in contrast to [10], which adopts
a passive positioning and contact tracing methodology, using
geographical data (BeepTrace-Passive), this paper focuses on
Bluetooth as the main technology for positioning and tracing,
in what we refer as BeepTrace-Active. Also, in [10] matching
is done at the blockchain level, whereas in this paper, we opt to
perform matching of contacts at the user mobile phone (local
matching). Moreover, in this work we also investigate the role
that public areas can play in contact tracing, and provide a
novel solution that integrates public locations in the contact
tracing process. By leveraging the power of blockchains, the
need for a specific company or government to hold contact
information is eliminated, data integrity is guaranteed and a
more transparent and immutable platform for end-users can
be provided. Based on this idea, the main objectives and
contributions of the paper are as follows:
• We propose a framework relying on blockchain for DCT,
namely BeepTrace-Active, in order to increase user pri-
vacy, security and transparency;
• We investigate the idea of public places acting as points
of interest and publicizing its information in a blockchain
and analyze the number of close contacts in such loca-
tions;
• We produce simulation results and analyze the impact and
performance of blockchain in DCT, while also providing
some guidance on contact tracing solutions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Gain Contact Information
There are many well-developed location sensing solutions
for contact tracing, such as Bluetooth, GPS, WiFi-Direct,
4G/5G [2], [6], [10], [11]. Generally, GPS has a good location
resolution to sub-meters, while it works poorly in urban areas
with buildings or in closed regions like shopping malls [12],
whereas WiFi access point-based localization is applicable for
indoor positioning. On the other hand, in outdoor regions,
where WiFi is unavailable, cellular networks like 4G and the
upcoming 5G, can be considered.
However, one of the most popular methods for DCT utilizes
Bluetooth, a short-range device-to-device solution, which pro-
vides connectivity information of carrying devices between
people. Specifically, Bluetooth provides contact information
for devices based on their connectivity states [13]. The sensing
range of Bluetooth is of approximately 10 meters, and devices
in the same Bluetooth area are considered to be close to
each other in location. WiFi-direct, another device-to-device
solution, is similar to Bluetooth, while its sensing range is
of 50 to 100 meters [14]. Naturally, a large sensing range
covers more devices, and hence more people can potentially be
identified. Therefore, it leads to an overestimation of contacts,
increasing the length of contact list of confirmed cases, while
the increased burden is affordable.
Unlike Bluetooth, which actively exchange messages be-
tween two devices, GPS, cellular and WiFi solutions provide
location estimates, which can be translated to contact infor-
mation, such as when two people come into close contact
with each other. However, GPS and cellular device localization
methods face serious concerns in terms of user privacy during
the location collection process and have to involve significantly
complex encryption to protect such systems [10]. Thus, in
this article, only Bluetooth and WiFi-direct based device-to-
device connection for managing people contact information are
considered. Since both Bluetooth and WiFi-direct can be used
to gain connectivity information of a user device to its nearby
devices by broadcasting messages with each other, without
requiring location labels of devices or user identities, user
privacy is protected.
B. Blockchain
Blockchain has been proven a powerful tool in multiple
industries including finance, supply chains, energy trading,
IoT, and cryptocurrencies, due to its advantages [9]:
• Replacing a central authority by a distributed one, im-
proving security and reducing costs;
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• All information stored in the blockchain is immutable,
which allows every participant to have access to this
permanent record of events and prevents the data being
tampered;
• Removing the risk of fraudulent messages and also pro-
viding greater transparency and efficiency to the general
public.
Blockchain consists of a distributed ledger that keeps every-
one’s data in an open, auditable, and tamper-proof distributed
storage solution, solving trust and transparency issues with
user privacy and accessibility in mind [10]. Blockchain is a
chain-like data structure consisting of blocks with a header and
a body, where the chain is organized using a hash tree [9].
Each block has a header with hash value associated to the
previous block’s content, establishing a retroactive connection
from the latest block to the genesis block, the first block in the
chain. It provides an unbreakable linkage to the fully traceable
records in the order of blocks, as such, users can verify the
integrity and authenticity of any known block by calculating
the hashed value and comparing it with the next block. Thus,
any changes to the previous block will tamper its integrity,
leading to a verification failure.
Every participant in the network holds a copy of the data,
in order to locate the latest block on the longest chain, which
makes the network distributed. Besides its unique data struc-
ture, the basis of blockchain’s trust comes from a collective
effort, the Consensus Mechanism (CM). Due to the special
needs of DCT, different blockchain CMs, such as, Proof-of-
Stake/Work and voting based mechanisms (practical Byzantine
fault tolerance) can be used [15]. The former is better in terms
of scalability, while the latter shows supremacy in terms of
transaction per second and confirmation delay. However, as it
will be verified by our simulations, both CMs are applicable
to DCT, with varying performance depending on the number
of confirmed patients or required notification speed.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Architecture
A high-level architecture of BeepTrace-Active, our
blockchain-based privacy-preserving contact tracing, is
illustrated in Fig. 1. As shown, there are three identities
including (i) on-device personal blockchain-based DCT
application, (ii) blockchain, (iii) hospital (or similar health
authority).
The function of each identity is summarized as follows:
• On-Device Personal Application: The application takes
charge of contact list management and case inquiry.
Based on the real-time information from Bluetooth or
WiFi-direct, the application creates a contact list for users,
in case they had a close contact or were in the same
public area at the same time. The application is also
responsible for inquiring the blockchain to check for
potential matches between the positive cases recorded in
blockchain and the ones stored locally.
• Blockchain: The blockchain records the pseudo-IDs of
confirmed cases based on medical reports from health
authorities. In addition, its data is open for case inquiry
from the application.
• Health Authorities: The health authorities take charge
of conducting virus tests of potentially infected people.
Health personnel upload the pseudo-IDs of positive cases
to the blockchain, forming a transparent and unalterable
record of positive case IDs.
As shown in Fig. 1, the workflow of the proposed scheme
is described as follows:
• (Step 1) Generate Pseudo-ID: The application of each
user periodically generates a temporary pseudo-ID (e.g.,
on each day or each hour). This ID includes a series of
random letters, used to distinguish users, and the created
time stamp. Since it is periodically generated at random,
it prevents the user location from being tracked, preserv-
ing user privacy. Even, when health authorities upload
the information to the blockchain, only the pseudo-IDs
of confirmed patients are visible, fully preserving their
identities. Moreover, to avoid privacy leakage by people
monitoring a device’s Bluetooth name, other protective
measures can be taken, such as the DCT application
periodically changing the Bluetooth name together with
the pseudo-IDs, as in [6].
• (Step 2) Broadcast Pseudo-IDs: During the wireless
connection period of a user’s mobile phone using either
Bluetooth or WiFi-direct, the ID is distributed to its
neighbors connecting with the UE’s mobile phone.
• (Step 3) Form Contacts List: A user can receive multiple
IDs in proximity in one day, and the application stores
these IDs locally, forming a contact ID list for this user.
As it will be shown in our simulations, the amount of
data required per day is less than half of an MB, thus the
proposed scheme would not require more than a couple
MB to store a couple of weeks worth of data.
• (Step 4) Virus Test: At any given time, people can go to
a hospital to perform a virus test.
• (Step 5) Upload Positive Cases: In case a person is tested
positive, health authorities are responsible for uploading
the IDs of confirmed cases. Since pseudo-IDs change
frequently, the application should also store the most
recent used IDs (in the last 14 days, for example). Thus,
it can upload all its previously used pseudo-IDs to the
blockchain.
• (Step 6) Record Positive Cases: The blockchain includes
the IDs of those positive cases in a new block, recording
the list of all positive-case IDs. Since these IDs do not
have any personal information and block generation is
distributed, there is no privacy concern.
• (Step 7) Periodic Update: The application downloads data
from the blockchain (e.g., on a daily basis). This data
consists of the pseudo-IDs of all people who have tested
positive during that day.
• (Step 8) Local Matching: The application compares if
any of the pseudo-IDs downloaded from the blockchain
is present in the contact list created in the user’s mobile
phone. Since this process is performed locally in the
mobile phone, it is also privacy preserving.
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Users
Fig. 1. Architecture of BeepTrace-Active, the proposed blockchain-based privacy-preserving DCT.
• (Step 9) Alert Generation: If the local matching returns
any positive result, the user is alerted by the application,
indicating to the user a high likelihood of exposure to
COVID-19.
B. Public Areas
In addition to involving people in contact tracing, the
possibility of risk level alerting for public areas, such as shops,
malls, or pharmacies to aid in DCT is also investigated. Since
these locations often act as gathering points, they can play an
important role in informing users about the risk of visiting
such places by, for example, estimating how many people are
at the location at any given time, the average distance between
people (given by the average number of people divided by the
area), or by informing if there were any recent confirmed cases
in the vicinity.
However, trusting third parties can be an issue, since such
locations would try to avoid publicizing information due to
personal, economical or political interests. In order to solve
such issues and increase the trustworthiness of public areas,
while also providing a safe environment for the general public,
the utilization of blockchain as the infrastructure for the
dissemination of such information is proposed. Based on that,
public areas could have a metric, or a risk level, which could
inform the public about the overall risk of exposure to COVID-
19. For example, whenever shops are crowded, the shop’s risk
level would be increased and uploaded to the blockchain, so
that users know that certain locations are riskier than others.
This can be used to not only attract customers to certain
locations, whenever the risk level of shops are low, but also
to limit the amount of people that visit such locations.
The proposed workflow of the scheme is as follows:
• People counting: Based on the number of Bluetooth or
WiFi-direct connections received by the hotspot of the
building, the number of people staying within this area
can be estimated. Because only the number of available
connections is monitored, users can change pseudo-IDs
without affecting the accuracy of the estimate.
• Risk assessment: Based on the obtained population
information, the infection risk level of this area can be
briefly estimated, in which a large population implies
a high risk level. In addition, public locations can also
have access to the pseudo-ID blockchains, in order to
periodically download data and determine if any person
that has visited the place recently tested positive for
COVID-19. In case of a confirmed positive visit in the last
14 days (according to the World Health Organization –
WHO, guidelines), the risk level of such locations can be
increased and all pseudo-IDs that have visited the location
can be notified.
Thus, our scheme can be used together with on-site review of
health authorities on infected people for their recent contacts,
improving the efficiency of DCT. Moreover, by integrating
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Point of Interest
Fig. 2. Framework for blockchain as an infrastructure for both DCT and public risk assessment.
public areas in the DCT process, it can bring significant
benefits in order to quickly and effectively control the spread
of the disease, as more people can be alerted.
C. Blockchain Procedure
In BeepTrace-Active we use blockchain as the medium for
information broadcasting, and storing the pseudo-IDs supplied
by confirmed patients. The local storage identified in Fig. 2
is a list of all pseudonyms by users, it is worth noting that
the user personal information is never shared in any case,
avoiding privacy leakage. By publishing the pseudo-IDs via
blockchain, the data is protected by it with ultimate privacy-
preservation, as the access information is not trackable if a
user matches the record in locally. This leaves the user with
more security and privacy, and eliminates the possibility of
malicious manipulations of test results. In addition, Fig. 2 also
shows how public locations can advertise information in the
blockchain. By estimating the number of people in a deter-
mined location, or by periodically downloading data from the
blockchain, the risk of public locations can be determined and
uploaded to a separate chain. This data can also be downloaded
by users, so they can assess the risks of going outside or
visiting certain places. Despite blockchain being widely used
as a distributed ledger for recording information agreed by
different parties that perform transactions, in this manuscript
the application scenarios of blockchain are further extended.
By integrating blockchain into DCT, confirmed COVID-19
cases can be published in the chain, allowing a tamper-free and
public access to this data in order to perform local matching.
This enhances user privacy, minimizes misinformation and can
also lead to an increase trust and, potentially, to the adoption
contact tracing, benefiting millions of people and mitigating
the impact of future pandemics.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the performance of BeepTrace-Active is eval-
uated. We first illustrate the simulation settings of this work,
and then compare results of two contact tracing technologies,
Bluetooth and WiFi-direct tracing. The following three metrics
are utilized to compare the two solutions:
1) Number of average close contacts: the total number of
contacts stored in the user’s mobile phone, sensed in the
last 14 days.
2) Mobile phone storage required per day: the amount of
data that each user needs to store every day, generated
by close contacts. This data is used for conducting a
mapping with daily confirmed cases, and is calculated
by multiplying the number of transactions (number of
daily confirmed cases) by the size of each transaction.
3) Number of required transactions per second: the number
of transactions per second in the blockchain network to
support our DCT mechanism.
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A. Simulation Settings
We set the population density as 3333.3/km2, the same as
the city of Glasgow. We set a total of 200 hotspots (such as
shopping malls, supermarkets, and parks) where people can
visit. Due to the special situation of COVID-19, we assume
that each user travels at most once per day and the probability
of a specific user to go out for a trip is set to p, which is related
to personal habit, government policy, the current situation, etc..
In this simulation, we use two values p = 0.2 and p = 0.6
to denote low-activity and high-activity scenarios, respectively.
The trips can start at any given time, and their durations are
randomly distributed, 1–4 hours. The total simulated time in
all scenarios is of 14 days.
For the two tracing methods considered in this paper, the
range (the radius of sensing area) is set as 10 and 50 meters for
Bluetooth and WiFi-direct, respectively. The sensing frequency
for both methods is set as 1 minute, meaning that each outdoor
user broadcasts his/her own temporary ID every minute. For
the pseudo-IDs, it is considered that they change at every
half an hour, for the sake of privacy preserving. Regarding
the blockchain, only the pseudo-IDs (of recent 14 days) of
confirmed cases are recorded into blocks as a transaction. We
set the length of a pseudo-ID to 64 bytes and the time of
transaction arrival is randomly distributed as the randomness
of the time distribution of confirmed cases in our system.
B. Simulation Results
Fig. 3 shows the number of average close contacts of the
two tracing methods for a varying number of users. We can
see that the number of close contacts of the two tracing
methods increase approximately linearly with the number of
users. This occurs because the same population density is
assumed throughout this experiment. Furthermore, we find that
the number of close contacts of WiFi-direct tracing is 1 to 2
times larger than that of Bluetooth, although the sensing area
is 25 times larger. This implies that increasing the sensing
range is not an efficient way for contact tracing. This occurs
because of an unbalanced user distribution, where more people
gather around hotspots, thus, increasing the sensing range is
not very effective in non-hotspot areas. Moreover, based on
calculations, we find that under the same sensing method
(Bluetooth or WiFi-direct), the number of close contacts in the
high-activity scenario is up to 8 to 10 times larger than that of
the low-activity scenario, even through the travel probability
is only 2 times higher.
Fig. 4 compares the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of required storage of both tracing methods under the two
activity levels. We can see that the amount of storage under
all four scenarios is always less than 0.4MB. Moreover,
considering that there is also the possibility of the applica-
tion deleting the data after a certain number of days, these
numbers demonstrate that BeepTrace-Active requires only a
little amount of storage (up to several MBs in 14 days). We
also estimate how much data needs to be downloaded from the
blockchain on a daily basis. Given that users are active only 8
hours per day, the size of a pseudo-ID is 64 bytes, and pseudo-
IDs change twice per hour, a single person produces exactly





Fig. 4. CDF of per day storage required at a user’s mobile phone.
1KB of data per day. Given that whenever a user tests positive
it needs to upload the pseudo-IDs used in the last 14 days, it
can be concluded that a positive case generates 14KB of data.
Considering that in most small countries, such as in Europe,
after restrictions were lifted, the peak of COVID-19 cases is
of about 3,000 cases, we estimate that no more than 42MB of
data needs to be downloaded everyday. In more extreme cases,
such as when the COVID-19 pandemic was at its worse and
the number of cases in countries reached 10,000 or 20,000
per day, the blockchain can also have a location stamp, so
that only users of that region download its data, drastically
reducing the download size.
Lastly, Fig. 5 shows a key performance metric in blockchain
networks, the transactions per second (TPS), against a different
number of daily confirmed cases, starting at 1, 000 (typical
value for a specific country) up to 200, 000 (typical value
for the whole world). Note that the number of TPS is not
related to the two sensing methods, thus the results of the two
methods should be the same, shown as Fig. 5. As expected,
we find that the number of TPS increases linearly with the
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number of daily confirmed cases (sudden changes occur due
to the non-linearity of the X-axis, which is set for an easier
comparison). Specifically, the number of TPS of high and low-
activity scenarios is about 30 and 10 respectively when the
number of daily confirmed cases is 8, 000. Moreover, even for
the whole world, in the scenario of 200, 000 daily confirmed
cases, we calculate that the required number of TPS is about
75 and 63 for both high and low-activity scenarios. These
numbers reveal that the number of TPS is not the bottleneck
of the proposed DCT system, since even traditional PoS-based
blockchain can achieve more than 100 TPS [15].
Sudden changes (due to 
non-linear scale of X-axis)
Fig. 5. Number of TPS vs. Number of daily confirmed cases.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this article we overviewed current solutions for contact
tracing and the most popular tracing methods. We have shown
that contract tracing has several privacy issues and have
presented a novel framework based on blockchain in order
to preserved the privacy for DCT. Based on this framework,
we have presented a framework on how blockchain can act
as the underlying infrastructure behind DCT and increase the
trust and privacy of its users, named as BeepTrace-Active. We
have also investigated how public locations can aid in DCT,
specially in publicly advertising their risk levels in order to
alert people on which locations are safe and which ones are
not. Based on these conditions, we analyzed the performance
of the proposed solution under different scenarios, and have
demonstrated that BeepTrace-Active is valid and efficient for
DCT in the battle against COVID-19.
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